Los de fen so res y opo nen tes de la fi gu ra del ju di cial re view que se lle va a cabo a tra vés de la de fen sa de las ga ran tías in di vi dua les en oca sio nes com par ten pun tos de vis ta en re la ción con los idea les po lí ti cos, sin embar go, exis ten pro fun dos de sa cuer dos en cuan to a la me jor for ma de pro mo cio nar los o en cuan to a la ma ne ra apro pia da de de ci dir ca sos concre tos en ca sos de con flic to. En su más re cien te li bro, Wil Wa lu chow inten ta pro por cio nar una teo ría del ju di cial re view que atien da ade cua damen te los idea les co mu nes de es ta bi li dad y adap ta bi li dad. El pun to me du lar de su ar gu men to es la no ción de la mo ra li dad de la co mu ni dad -aque lla que per mi te a los jue ces cons ti tu cio na les de sa rro llar las ga rantías y de re chos (adap ta bi li dad) mien tras que se con ti núa leal a los princi pios de de mo cra cia y Esta do de de re cho (es ta bi li dad)-. El ob je ti vo de este tra ba jo es ofre cer una crí ti ca a esta no ción de mo ra li dad de la comu ni dad, con cre ta men te el ob je ti vo es plan tear un reto a la cues tión de asu mir que la mo ra li dad de los miem bros de las so cie da des mo der nas plu ra les es tan uni for me como lo exi ge la teo ría de Wa lu chow.
I
Wil Waluchow has re cently of fered an in trigu ing de fense of ju di cial re view un der charters of rights. The core of his argu ment lies in a re vi sion of a rel a tively wide spread no tion of the func tion of charters of rights in mod ern de moc ra cies. This is how Waluchow sums up his point: We should re ject the view of Charters as con fi dent, hubristic at tempts to estab lish il lu sory fixed points of agree ment and pre-com mitment. We should view them in stead as liv ing trees whose roots are fixed by fac tors like pre ce dent, the com mu nity's moral judg ments in re flec tive equi lib rium, and the terms it has cho sen (in its Char ter) to ex press the fun da men tal com mit ments of its con sti tu tional mo ral ity (p. 270-271.) 1 As the met a phor sug gests, by its ref er ence to liv ing trees and fixed roots, Waluchow's cen tral aim is to pro vide a theory of ju di cial re view that bal ances the (fre quently con flicting) ide als of adapt abil ity and sta bil ity. A so ci ety evolves and so do its needs. This calls for oc ca sional changes in its le gal struc ture. But such changes should be re al ized within lim its. For one, they should not be too fast or too deep or in any way too trau matic for the many in di vid u als who rely on ex ist ing so cial norms. Also, they should not be based on indi vid ual whim, but should be sub jected to con straints of dem o cratic ped i gree. Ac cord ing to Waluchow, a healthy balance be tween sta bil ity and adapt abil ity is guar an teed by a the ory of ju di cial re view that al lows judges to de velop the law as es tab lished in charters of rights, but to do so incremen tally and within the lim its set by ob jec tive fac tors such as con sti tu tional text, precedent and the community's (true) morality.
We have much sym pa thy for Waluchow's gen eral pro ject. We share the ide als he wants to serve through his the ory (i.e. sta bil ity and adapt abil ity), and we find his no tion of the func tion of charters of rights much more ap peal ing than 135 DIFFICULTIES WITH WALUCHOW´S CONCEPTION OF THE COMMUNITY the pop u lar, hubristic no tion of charters as doc u ments capa ble of es tab lish ing fixed points of pre-com mit ment. However, we have some wor ries about the de tails of Waluchow's the ory. In par tic u lar, we worry that Waluchow is too con fident about the guid ing ca pac ity of what he de scribes as the true mo ral ity of the com mu nity. 2 In the pas sage quoted above, Waluchow re fers to the mo ral ity of the com mu nity as one of the fac tors that help fix the roots of the liv ing tree. As we un der stand this as ser tion, for the mo ral ity of the com mu nity to fix any thing it must be gen u inely ac tionguid ing, that is, it must pro vide pre scrip tions pre cise enough to limit the dis cre tion of judges ad ju di cat ing un der a char ter of rights. For if the mo ral ity of the com mu nity does not re ally guide ac tion, then the talk of its fix ing roots is mis lead ing. And if the talk of fix ing roots is mis lead ing, then Waluchow's cru cial con ten tion that his theory adequately serves the value of stability becomes im plau si ble.
136 STRUCHINER / PERIN SHECAIRA 2 Even though we will not dis cuss this much in the pa per, we should point out that we are equally sceptical about the pos si bil ity of pre ce dents and word choice be ing ca pa ble of fix ing roots. This is not to say that we do not be lieve in the firm guid ing ca pac i ties of pre ce dent and word-mean ing. As Hart, we agree that both forms of com mu ni cat ing di rec tives can be ef fec tive. In a com mu nity where language mean ing is taken se ri ously, both pre ce dents and ex plicit rule-like man dates can con strain de ci sions in cases that fall un der their core mean ings. But also in accord with Hart, we think that these strat e gies for es tab lish ing stan dards of conduct that can be fol lowed with out fur ther con sid er ations in many sit u a tions can nev er the less gen er ate indeterminacies due mainly to ab in itio vague ness or po tential vague ness (open tex ture). When the lan guage of pre ce dent or charters does not con strain be cause of long stand ing vague ness or concretized po ten tial vague ness then we are in the realm of hard cases, the cases that fall un der a pen um bra of doubt. Many of the cases that call for ju di cial re view un der charters (per haps most of them) are cases where the con ven tional mean ing of the lan guage of both pre cedents and charters will not dic tate a clear an swer and there fore will not fix roots. As we un der stand Waluchow's pro posal, the true mo ral ity of the com mu nity is the only means avail able (i.e. ac cept able) for fill ing in the pores of the rel e vant con stitu tional norms. In some cases, one of which will be dis cussed later in the pa per, the true mo ral ity of the com mu nity might even be ca pa ble of dis lodg ing well es tablished pre ce dents or well es tab lished in ter pre ta tions of char ter lan guage. That is why we will fo cus on com mu nity mo ral ity: the vi a bil ity of Waluchow's pro posal is highly de pend ent on the vi a bil ity of this no tion.
II
We are not the first to find se ri ous prob lems in Waluchow's no tion of com mu nity mo ral ity. Sev eral com men ta tors have al ready ques tioned his con fi dence in its ca pac ity to constrain ju di cial rea son ing and de ci sion-mak ing. 3 There fore, our ob jec tions won't be en tirely novel, but they should make the case against com mu nity mo ral ity even more com pel ling.
Ac cord ing to Waluchow, the com mu nity's true mo ral ity emerges once the moral opin ions of the com mu nity have been sub jected to a pro cess of ra tio nal re vi sion. This does not amount to rec ti fy ing the com mu nity's moral opin ions in the light of one's pre ferred moral the ory. For in stance, a util i tar ian judge, no mat ter how co gent his ar gu ments in fa vor of util i tar i an ism, should not re shape the moral opinions of the com mu nity in or der to es chew or mit i gate its non-util i tar ian ten den cies. In stead, what a judge may do is take the com mu nity's moral be liefs (in all lev els of ab straction) and make sure they are co her ent among them selves. If the re sult of this pro cess is a com mu nity mo ral ity that has a util i tar ian feel to it, then that should be be cause the commu nity's most fun da men tal con vic tions were al ready util itar ian to be gin with, not be cause the util i tar ian judge did his best to make them so.
Waluchow's de scrip tion of the pro cess of re vi sion that should gen er ate the true mo ral ity of the com mu nity is ac tually quite vague. He claims that it is "some thing like" (p. 223) John Rawls's re flec tive equi lib rium, but does not say too much more about it. It does seem, how ever, that he has nar row re flec tive equi lib rium in mind, as he never men tions the pos si bil ity of ex am in ing the com mu nity's back ground (so cio log i cal, psy cho log i cal, meta phys i cal, etc.) be liefs in order to see if they co here with their spe cif i cally moral be liefs. Waluchow also seems to hold the com mon view that re flective equi lib rium goes nat u rally with a roughly coherentist moral epis te mol ogy. In other words, the firmly held moral con vic tions of the com mu nity, though they may have in depend ent pro tanto cred i bil ity, can nat u rally be over rid den or re shaped some where along the pro cess of re vi sion. There is not much more we can say about Waluchow's no tion of reflective equilibrium, since, again, he is not very precise about this.
If we are right about Waluchow's views on re flec tive equilib rium, then his the ory of ju di cial re view un der charters of rights runs into some prob lems. The first thing that co mes to mind is that he over es ti mates the amount of agree ment within com mu ni ties on the type of moral ques tion that arises in cases of ju di cial re view un der charters. To be sure, Waluchow is not claim ing that the com mu nity fre quently ex hib its uni for mity in all its (su per fi cial) moral opin ions regard ing the sort of case that elic its ju di cial re view. What he is ac tu ally say ing is that there is suf fi cient uni for mity regard ing the com mu nity's true moral com mit ments per taining to that sort of case. Af ter the com mu nity's expectedly di verg ing moral opin ions are put to a test of in ter nal co herence, it is likely that a uni form po si tion will emerge. In other words, lack of con sen sus in moral opin ion does not pre clude the likelihood of consensus regarding fundamental moral commitments.
While this qual i fi ca tion is enough to show that Waluchow's claim about con sen sus is not na ive, it hardly shows that it is true. It re mains to be shown that the ex ist ing consen sus pro vides a wide enough base on which to build the com mu nity's true mo ral ity. In all fair ness, it is not un reason able to be lieve that, even in plu ral so ci et ies such as the ones Waluchow is con cerned with, there is gen eral agreement on many im por tant moral ques tions. But there is really no rea son to be lieve that the agree ment is sig nif i cant in the do main of moral de bate that con cerns us. It seems that Waluchow has to carry the bur den of proof here -and it is a heavy bur den to bear. 4 To show that his con fi dence in the 138 STRUCHINER / PERIN SHECAIRA sig nif i cance of con sen sus is war ranted, Waluchow should, at the very least, be ca pa ble of pro duc ing some (two? three?) con crete ex am ples. But he does not suc ceed in that task: his ex am ples are scarce and un con vinc ing. In fact, there is only one example which he discusses in detail:
...the prin ci ples and con sid ered judg ments upon which most rea son able Ca na di ans, of what ever po lit i cal and moral stripe, are keen to con demn ra cial big otry and sex ism and that vir tu ally all would agree are em bod ied in the Char ter and the ju ris pru dence sur round ing its in ter pre ta tion equally con demn prej u dice against same-sex mar riage. This de spite the fact that many do not (yet, I hope) see this con nec tion... (p. 225) There are ob vi ous prob lems here. For one thing, Waluchow does not ex plain what he means by "rea son able." If he holds a rich enough con cep tion of rea son able ness, then he may be jeop ar diz ing his cen tral claim that, in subject ing the com mu nity's moral opin ions to ra tio nal re vi sion, one is not re ar rang ing it in light of one's own sub jec tive moral be liefs. For it is one thing to say that the com munity's opin ions should be made in ter nally co her ent, but it is quite an other to say that the opin ions of the rea son able 139 DIFFICULTIES WITH WALUCHOW´S CONCEPTION OF THE COMMUNITY ready abun dant. Re cently, Jon a than Haidt and oth ers have done much work in order to ex plain the di vide on moral is sues be tween lib er als and con ser va tives. From a de scrip tive/ex plan a tory point of view about how we come to have the moral be lief sets that we do, he de fends the "Moral Foun da tions The ory". Ac cord ing to this theory there are cer tain ba sic modes of re sponse, cer tain learn ing mod ules or psy cholog i cal mech a nisms, shared by all hu man be ings, which are pre pared to re act to five sets of pat terns in the so cial world. He of fers the fol low ing (ten ta tive) tax on omy to try to cap ture these five ba sic re sponse modes or moral foun da tions for the bases of moral judg ments, in tu itions, and con cerns: harm/care; fair ness/rec iproc ity; ingroup/loy alty; au thor ity/re spect; pu rity/sanc tity. While lib eral mo ral ities are em pir i cally de mon stra ble to hinge upon pre oc cu pa tions with harm and fair ness, con ser va tives´ moral con cerns are dis trib uted more evenly across all five foun da tions. These con sid er ations, if cor rect, ex plain why lib er als and con ser vatives have such di ver gent pro found moral com mit ments in re la tion to many is sues which can not, at the mo ment, be rec on ciled with each other through the method of nar row re flec tive equi lib rium. We be lieve that nar row re flec tive equi lib rium would re quire fac tor ing in both the moral views of con ser va tives and lib er als and no true ho mo ge neous moral com mit ments would emerge in most, even if not all, cases that oc cupy our at ten tion when we dis cuss ju di cial re view un der charters. mem bers of the com mu nity should be made in ter nally coher ent. Co her ence is not a mor ally loaded con cept, but reason able ness is. In deed, it can be a very rich moral con cept, ex clud ing any moral opin ion that fails to sat isfy strict cri teria; or it can be a more mod est con cept, that is, one that only ex cludes grossly im plau si ble (though in ter nally co herent) moral views. 5 Let us as sume that Waluchow uses a mod est no tion of rea son able ness. 6 In this case, if all moral views that are not 140 STRUCHINER / PERIN SHECAIRA 5 To be sure, both con cepts, rich or mod est, pres ent prob lems due to their vague ness and sub jec tiv ity. But as the mod est no tion is ar gu ably less vague, one might say that the prob lems it poses are, ac cord ingly, less sig nif i cant. The dif ference be tween the two may be il lus trated by some quips picked up from Kwame Appiah's (2008) dis cus sion of a closely re lated is sue. A rich no tion of rea son ableness is very likely to be con tro ver sial in a plu ral so ci ety. And sim i larly, the con stitu tional ad ju di ca tor's no tion of rea son able ness is likely to be re garded with sus picion by any dis sent ing Ca na dian. Any at tempt by the ad ju di ca tor to base a de ci sion on what "we, rea son able Ca na di ans, be lieve" should be met by dis sent ers with the fol low ing com plaint: "What do you mean 'we,' Kemo Sabe?" (Appiah, 2008, p. 80) . The use of a mod est no tion of rea son able ness might not pro voke such an un con genial re sponse, but it should also raise some eye brows. For who has the au thor ity to say that a moral opin ion rel a tive to a char ter case is grossly im plau si ble? Is it the kind of thing that is just ob vi ous? Here Appiah tells a story of a Cam bridge math ema ti cian who af ter hav ing filled the chalk board of his class with a vast and in tricate equa tion, un der lined the re sult for the equa tion and told his class: "As you can see, it's ob vi ous." How ever, he was taken by a sud den doubt, and, with a furrowed brow, left the room, only to re turn five min utes later. Upon his re turn, demon strat ing to be in fine spir its and no lon ger wor ried, he as sured his stu dent: "Why, yes, in deed, it is ob vi ous." (Appiah, 2008, p. 81) . 6 Again, this as sump tion as suages our worry about Waluchow's in tro duc tion of the con cept of rea son able ness in the de bate, but it does not dis pel the worry entirely. The prob lem we see is not lim ited to the fact that even a mod est con cept of rea son able ness is too vague to con strain ju di cial de ci sion-mak ing (this point is made in the en su ing part of the text). More fun da men tally, we do not know how to rec on cile Waluchow's iso lated ref er ence to rea son able ness with the rest of his book. In one par tic u lar pas sage he de scribes his the ory -in terms bor rowed from Julie Dick son -as "in di rectly evaluative" (p. 227). Waluchow then goes on to say (or rather re af firm) that his the ory is not ca pa ble of rec ti fy ing a com mu nity mo ral ity when it is fun da men tally de plor able; and he gives apart heid South Af rica as a histor i cal ex am ple. Well, it is pretty clear from these claims that Waluchow's the ory is not de signed to trans form an un rea son able com mu nity mo ral ity into a rea son able one. But if that is the case, why the ref er ence to rea son able ness at all? Appiah has said that the method of re flec tive equi lib rium (at least in its nar row ver sion) can do no more than give our ex tant moral opin ions a hair cut and a shave (Appiah, 2008, p. 80) . Waluchow seems to agree with this in most of his book, but then he talks about rea son able ness and gives us as a sur pris ing pic ture of an ad ju di ca tor that grossly im plau si ble are re ally taken into ac count in the process of ra tio nal re vi sion, then Waluchow's con fi dence in a con ver gence of the Ca na dian com mu nity around same-sex mar riage is un war ranted. There is no rea son to think that one can not (in Can ada or else where), rea son ably and co herently, en dorse moral prin ci ples that re ject rac ism and sexism, and yet take the view that same-sex mar riage should not be a le gally valid in sti tu tion. To be gin, one's po si tion on the mo ral ity of a le gal norm does not nec es sar ily mir ror one's view about the mo ral ity of the in di vid ual acts cov ered by the norm. For in stance, one may find abor tion mor ally ob jec tion able, and yet op pose an anti-abor tion law. This is quite com mon among peo ple who tend to eval u ate so cial insti tu tions in a consequentialist fash ion. While abor tion may be wrong, the ef fects of its pro hi bi tion (e.g. the prob a ble pro lif er a tion of "back-al ley" abor tions) may be even worse. The same ap plies to same-sex mar riage. Some one might favor laws against ra cial and sex ual dis crim i na tion, and perhaps even sup port laws rec og niz ing ba sic rights to samesex cou ples, and yet be lieve that same-sex mar riage is a dan ger ous in sti tu tion, as it would be a large step to wards, say, the le gal iza tion of the adop tion of small, psy cho log ically vul ner a ble chil dren by same-sex cou ples. This par ticu lar line of ar gu ment may seem un con vinc ing to many (as it does to us), but it is hardly un rea son able. To ex clude it from the base of agree ment upon which the true mo ral ity of the com mu nity is to be built is to in ter fere in the com munity's opin ions in a way that Waluchow's the ory should not al low (if it in deed wishes to limit ju di cial dis cre tion).
An other way to chal lenge Waluchow's con fi dence in the con sen sus of Ca na di ans re gard ing same-sex mar riage is as fol lows. If we take the coherentist model of rea son ing that un der lies Waluchow's ar gu ment se ri ously, then we should ac knowl edge that none of the moral be liefs that are put to the test of in ter nal co her ence are im mune from re vi sion.
Ca na di ans who firmly re ject rac ism and sex ism may have an equally firm moral con vic tion in the value of tra di tional, het ero sex ual mar riage. And to ac com mo date the lat ter convic tion they may be will ing to make changes else where in their be lief set. When con sid er ing the im pli ca tions of their views on mar riage, they might even wish to go back and reeval u ate their prior com mit ment to be liefs on rac ism and sex ism. To elect cer tain con vic tions as non-re vis able would be to, ar bi trarily, trans form a co her ence model of rea son ing into a foundationalist one -wherein the relevant foundations are chosen not by the community but by the judge! Now, Waluchow prob a bly would want to make a re ply at this point. He would want to crit i cize us for in ap pro pri ately ed it ing his ar gu ment. We should not have cut short the pas sage quoted above with a sneaky el lip sis. The pas sage continues:
This de spite the fact that many do not (yet, I hope) see this con nec tion and will per haps not do so un less it is pointed out to them by some other party, per haps the Su preme Court in a land mark rul ing. (p. 225, no ital ics in the orig i nal)
In deed, the part left out be fore is not ir rel e vant. Waluchow is very ex plicit about the fact that pre ce dent is a key el e ment in the con struc tion of the mo ral ity of the commu nity (p. 237). In ad di tion to the con sen sual moral convic tions of the com mu nity, le gal pre ce dent also con trib utes to widen the base upon which a uni form com mu nity mo rality is to be built. How ever, we see two rea sons why this appeal to pre ce dent is not as help ful as it may seem. First, in ac cor dance with the coherentist model we have been assum ing, pre ce dent, like any other moral be lief, is overridable. In or der to ac com mo date a firm moral con vic tion (whether it con cerns same-sex mar riage or not) one may be happy to re ject a pre ce dent whose im pli ca tions do not cohere with that con vic tion. Sec ond, and more fun da mentally, it is se ri ously mis lead ing to sug gest that pre ce dent can be a part of the mo ral ity of the com mu nity when con tro -ver sial moral is sues are con cerned. Cit ing Tony Honoré and Jo seph Raz (p. 233), Waluchow talks about how com mu nity mo ral ity is but an out line whose miss ing de tails should be filled in by le gal judg ments. Well, the met a phor is apt, but not for all of Waluchow's pur poses. In those ar eas where mo ral ity is gen u inely in de ter mi nate, it is in deed sen si ble to say that le gal judg ments may le git i mately of fer as sis tance. That is, when the con sen sual moral com mit ments of the com mu nity would equally al low any one of a cou ple or several dif fer ent mea sures, the one cho sen by le gal of fi cials, for rea sons re lated to ef fi ciency and pre dict abil ity, should govern. But where the com mu nity is not in dif fer ent, but in fact deeply di vided, law's func tion as a gap-filler is highly de batable. It seems to us that when (for in stance) a judge chooses to al low same-sex mar riage in a com mu nity that dif fers on the mo ral ity of this in sti tu tion, he is not sim ply "fill ing in" a de tail; he is in fact tak ing sides and validating the commitments of a part of the community, in spite of the commitments of the other part (which may be no less numerous or reasonable than the first).
III
These are the ob jec tions we are pre pared to make re garding one of Waluchow's rare ex am ples of uni for mity in the moral com mit ments of plu ral so ci et ies. But there is a further, and fi nal is sue that arises from the con sid er ation of a case about which, this time, Waluchow con cedes that it is very un likely that a plu ral society will agree.
In deed, on some highly con test able ques tions, for ex ample ques tions con cern ing the mo ral ity of abor tion, there may be no over lap ping con sen sus, im plicit or oth er wise. If so, then the com mu nity's con sti tu tional mo ral ity will fail to pro vide de ter mi nate an swers in Char ter cases, and judges will have to draw upon other resources... (p. 228-229) .
One won ders why Waluchow would think that abor tion does not ad mit of con sen sus where same-sex mar riage does.
Both is sues are equally con tro ver sial in plu ral so ci et ies, at least when un re vised moral opin ions are con cerned. Waluchow can not be say ing this just be cause the par tic ipants in the de bate about abor tion, what ever their other moral be liefs, are not pre pared to give up their in di vid ual views about abor tion. For this is pre cisely one of the rea sons why we think there can be no con sen sus on same-sex marriage: un der a co her ence model of rea son ing, no be lief en joys ab so lute cred i bil ity. An other rea son why Waluchow may see abor tion as such a di vi sive is sue is that de bate about abortion can hardly avoid ref er ence to is sues even more com plex and puz zling than moral is sues. When does life be gin? How con scious is a fe tus, if at all? (Not to speak of the re li gious ques tions typ i cally elic ited.) But this would lead us down a path that is not con sis tent with what was said ear lier in the pa per. Waluchow sug gests that a re vi sion of the com munity's moral be liefs should be done in ac cor dance with the method of nar row re flec tive equi lib rium, that is, a method that at tempts to pro duce a co her ent moral the ory, but ignores the (in)co her ence of such a the ory with one's metaphys ics, for in stance. This fi nal point should be un der stood not so much as an ob jec tion to but as the ex pres sion of a gen u ine doubt about Waluchow's no tion of true com mu nity mo ral ity and the method that yields it. If he re ally has narrow re flec tive equi lib rium in mind, then why would n't abortion pos si bly be an ob ject of con sen sus, whereas same-sex mar riage would? This re ally is n't clear in Waluchow's work. It is an im por tant point though, be cause un der stand ing why he be lieves there can not be agree ment on some cases, might help us have a better grasp of why he thinks there can be agree ment in other, equally dis puted cases.
In a fi nal note, there is no doubt that Waluchow is a metic u lous le gal thinker not ac cus tomed to leav ing loop holes in his work. As was said ear lier, we are very sym pa thetic to his gen eral pro ject of find ing a mid dle ground be tween the vir tues of sta bil ity and flex i bil ity. But un til he can dem onstrate, in clear light, how the method of nar row re flec tive equi lib rium can tease out the true moral com mit ments of a deeply di vided com mu nity, we will con tinue be liev ing that the "Liv ing Tree" has its roots fixed in quicksand.
